This paper argues that it is countries' historical experience with democracy, the democratic capital stock, rather than current levels of democracy that determines current climate change policies. Empirical evidence using data starting as far back as year 1800 for 87 countries, which together are responsible for 93.7% of global carbon emissions, suggests that the democratic capital stock has an important and robust effect on climate change policies. A history of executive constraints is particularly important. The current level of democracy does not play a role once democratic capital has been accounted for.
Introduction
The recent Arab Spring, with its promise of a further spread of democracy, brings renewed attention to the issue of democracy and its effects on social and policy outcomes. While the Arab Spring has yet to deliver on its promise and the environment does not feature much in the struggle between the democracy activists and the authoritarian regimes, an improved understanding of the relationship between democracy and environmental policies appears highly relevant and important. In this paper, we seek to shed new light on the empirical effects of democracy on climate change policies. In contrast to the existing literature, we focus on the effects of countries' long run history of democratic experience. We aim to contribute to our understanding of how the democratization process occurring across the globe for the last two centuries determines recent policies addressing climate change. In particular, we investigate the effect of "democratic capital" on environmental policies addressing climate change, where "democratic capital" is defined, following Persson and Tabellini (2009) , as a country's accumulated stock of civic and social assets built by historical experience with democracy.
The existing theoretical and empirical literatures on the effects of democracy on environmental policies and quality have reported ambiguous or weakly positive effects. We argue that this literature is incomplete and misses potentially important effects; it has not fully taken countries' histories of democracy and autocracy into account, in particular with regard to recently implemented climate change policies.
Our empirical work utilizes the Climate Laws, Institutions and Measures Index (CLIMI) from Steves et al. (2013) , a composite index of multiple aspects of climate change policy. Using data classifying countries as democracies and autocracies going as far back as year 1800, we find that democratic capital has a robust positive effect on national and multi-lateral policies addressing climate change. Moreover, once we control for democratic capital, the current level of democracy has no significant impact. These results are robust toward including further control variables, instrumenting for democratic capital with the democratic capital of contiguous countries and excluding countries from certain regions one at a time in regional jackknife estimations. Our results also hold up to using an alternative dependent variable (Esty et al., 2005) , measuring the degree of global environmental cooperation. In an extension, we differentiate between two different components of our democracy measure. We find that the stock of executive constraints, i.e., a larger cumulative historical experience with constraints facing the executive, drives our results. In contrast, the stock of political competition has no statistically significant effect.
It appears that we cannot expect climate change policies (and perhaps international environmental policies more generally) to improve rapidly in countries that recently experienced democratization. Only over time do democratic principles penetrate a society and its policymaking apparatus sufficiently to have a positive effect. If countries consolidate democracy, and in particular put sufficient constraints on the executive, we expect environmental policies to become more stringent over time.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 revisits the effect of democracy on the environment and develops our argument why democratic history matters. Section 3 reviews the existing literature and Section 4 discusses our empirical approach and data. Section 5 reports our main results, while Section 6 presents our robustness analysis. Section 7 concludes.
Revisiting the Effect of Democracy on the Environment: Why History Matters
A number of theoretical predictions exist regarding the effect of the current level of democracy on environmental policies. Congleton (1992) argues that autocrats' time horizons are shorter and they therefore set weaker environmental policies. An autocratic ruler is also likely to appropriate a larger share of the economy's income for himself, which has an ambiguous effect on the strictness of environmental regulations. The autocrat's marginal cost of environmental standards increases since she now bears a larger share of the associated fall in national income. Meanwhile, a higher income may also lead the autocrat to set stricter environmental standards if environmental quality is a normal good. However, environmental quality is a public good and the very rich can buy themselves out of the exposure to pollution. Thus, an argument building on environmental quality being a normal good does not apply (Hotte and Winer, 2012) . Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue that policymaking in democracies and autocracies differs because policymakers in democracies are forced to take a large share of the population into account, rather than just the elite as in autocracies. In democracies, the loyalties to leaders are weaker, forcing leaders to provide higher levels of public goods in order to survive in office. Olson (1993) , McGuire and Olson (1996) , and Deacon (2009) argue that the small elites which govern autocracies are focused on personal self-enrichment and are unwilling to forgo private benefits in order to provide public goods that benefit the masses. With a higher level of political participation, delivering social welfare and public goods becomes a greater concern in a democracy, as long as the median voter prefers greater environmental quality (Bättig and Bernauer, 2009) . The pressure to take pollution damage (social welfare) into account also depends on the degree of political competition and accountability (Fredriksson et al., 2005; List and Sturm, 2006; Wilson and Damania, 2005) . Farzin and Bond (2006) argue that interactions exist between the levels of democracy, income, income inequality, urbanization, education, and age distribution (see also Eriksson and Persson, 2003) .
1 Improved democracy is predicted to raise pollution abatement. Barrett and Graddy (2000) and Torras and Boyce (1998) argue that democratization makes citizens better informed and better organized for protest. Bättig and Bernauer (2009) suggest that greater freedom to travel internationally, to pursue joint research, to communicate, and to exchange ideas with foreigners leads to greater awareness of environmental issues, their risks, and their mitigation. Moreover, while democratization stimulates industry lobbying, it also encourages environmental lobbying, including on international cooperation.
Since climate change mitigation is a global public good, its geographic scope does not correspond to political jurisdictions. Democratic systems operate primarily at the national (and more local) level, rather than at the international level, and democracy may therefore have a smaller effect on the provision of global transboundary public goods than on local public goods. However, as argued by Bättig and Bernauer (2009) there is no reason why (due to this free-rider problem) further democratization would have differential effects in democracies and autocracies.
While the theories discussed above focus on the policy effects of the current level of democracy, they are still relevant for our empirical investigation which focuses on the stock of democratic capital. Today's environmental policies are the result of numerous historical institutional and policy choices, all influenced by the level of democracy at the time. Different historical experiences with democracy are likely to lead to different policy outcomes, as previous decisions form the base for subsequent choices. Our measure of democratic capital takes this historical process into account. Moreover, our measure helps capture transitions between democracy and autocracy which are by themselves likely to be detrimental to building the institutions needed to produce global public goods.
It may also take time for environmental policy to become a focus of the democratic process. In countries such as Serbia and Sierra Leone with high values of current democracy but with limited histories of democracy, the democratic and electoral process may not have had enough time to focus on a "secondary policy" (List and Sturm, 2006) such as environmental policy. 3 Only over time will voters and environmental interest groups (needing time to organize) pressure politicians to start formulating appropriate institutions and policies. One channel through which the democratic capital stock may affect environmental policy is by raising expectations that the country will be a stable democracy in the future (Persson and Tabellini, 2009 ). Persson and Tabellini report that the probability of a currently democratic country remaining democratic increases with a larger democratic capital stock, and that democratic capital raises economic growth (indirectly, by increasing stability). 4 Persson and Tabellini argue that a virtuous circle exists where the accumulation of democratic and physical capital reinforces each other. Thus, democratic capital may actually help drive the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) relationship documented in the literature (Dinda, 2004; Fosten et al., 2012) . Second, an expectation of continued stable democracy may also result in advocates for environmental policies having a greater incentive to fight for reform because their influence will continue in the future. Third, an expectation of continued democracy increases the time horizon of politicians and political parties. This matters for environmental policymaking where costs occur earlier than the benefits, especially for climate change policies. If democracy is more likely to prevail, democratic parties and their constituent groups are more likely to benefit from implemented environmental policies in the future.
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Fourth, if polluting industries have higher expectations that the country will remain democratic it may be relatively less beneficial to wait with investment in pollution control technology and to lobby against regulations. Fifth, competitive leadership selection processes in democracies are likely to yield more competent leaders (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2011) . 6 Since environmental policies are generally built slowly over time, a history of competent leaders influences policy outcomes positively.
1 Future research may want to evaluate such interactions using measures of democratic capital. In this paper, we abstract from these issues as we focus on the implications of democratic capital for this literature. 2 Bättig and Bernauer (2009) cite efforts to protect the ozone layer as an example. 3 List and Sturm provide a model where politicians use a "secondary policy" to cater to an interest group with strong preferences, but only as long as they are eligible for reelection. This model receives empirical support (see also Fredriksson et al., 2011) . 4 A current autocracy is also more likely to transition into a democracy the greater is its democratic capital. 5 Fredriksson and Wollscheid (2013) provide evidence that countries with older (stronger) political parties have stricter national environmental policies, but only if political stability is high. 6 Besley and Reynal-Querol report that democratically elected leaders are more likely to be highly educated.
Sixth, even in a current autocracy, the policy effects of previous democratic experiences may persist as policies may not be dismantled immediately (Coate and Morris, 1999) . Also, political parties and individuals with democratic experience may be more likely to find ways to influence autocrats through collective action, particularly in the presence of "institutionalized" ruling parties with a long history at the time of taking power Keefer, 2011, 2012) . Conversely, a current autocracy with a significant history of democracy may reintroduce stringent environmental policies more quickly due to its institutional and cultural memory, compared to a country without democratic experience.
Existing Literature and Our Contribution
While several studies in the empirical literature establish a positive relationship between the current level of democracy and the stringency of environmental policies or quality, the opposite is also reported. We are among the first to argue and show that it is democratic capital rather than the current level of democracy that matters for climate change and, particularly, for climate change policies. Our findings thus complement and bring some clarity to the existing empirical literature.
Democratic countries have been found more likely to be associated with lower atmospheric and water emissions such as of chlorofluorocarbon, SO 2 and CO 2 , smoke, heavy particles, total suspended particles, chemical and biological oxygen demand and fecal concentration in water (Barrett and Graddy, 2000; Koubi, 2009, 2013; Farzin and Bond, 2006; Li and Reuveny, 2006; Winslow, 2005) . More democratic countries are more prone to reduce the lead content in gasoline, provide public sanitation, protect land, and to reduce deforestation (Buitzenzorgy and Mol, 2011; Deacon, 2009; Fredriksson et al., 2005) . Democracies are also more likely to ratify the Montreal Protocol, the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, and to comply with multilateral environmental agreements (Congleton, 1992; Fredriksson and Gaston, 2000; Fredriksson et al., 2007; Neumayer, 2002a; von Stein, 2008) .
However, Scruggs (1998) finds an insignificant relationship between democracy and three environmental indicators (dissolved oxygen demand, fecal coliform, particulates) once income inequality has been controlled for. Roberts and Parks (2007) find a negligible impact on CO 2 , while Arvin and Lew (2011) find mixed results on CO 2 emissions, water pollution, and developing country deforestation. Midlarsky (1998) argues that improved democracy increases deforestation, CO 2 emissions, and water-related soil erosion. Bernauer and Kuhn (2010) report inconclusive evidence that democracy affects transboundary emissions in European rivers. Steves et al. (2013) find no effect of current democracy on CLIMI (which we also use), but do not include the democratic capital stock. Another major difference between our models and those presented by Steves et al. (2013) is that we control for GDP/capita, while they do not, and our sample is more globally representative, including 16 more countries. 7 In total, our sample's 87 countries are responsible for 93.7%
of global carbon emissions. Two previous papers use some forms of measures of democratic experience. Gallagher and Thacker (2008) study the EKC hypothesis using 1960-2000 data on CO 2 and SO 2 emissions from up to 156 countries and include a measure of "democracy stock". Their paper differs from ours because, first, their data cannot capture the effects that the Kyoto Protocol may have had beyond 2000. Second, their analysis focuses on carbon emissions only, whereas our focus is on a comprehensive measure of climate change policies.
8 Third, we account for the potential endogeneity of democratic capital stock by instrumental variable regression. Moreover, as measure of democracy stock, Gallagher and Thacker sum each country's polity2 score from 1900 onwards (Polity IV data by Marshall and Jaggers, 2007) , discounted by one percent per year. This is consequently a different measure than our democratic capital stock measure, and it does not go as far back as some of our measures. Gallagher and Thacker find a negative effect of democracy stock on both CO 2 and SO 2 emissions. Similar to us, they find no effect of the current level of democracy once democracy stock is included in their global sample. But current democracy does have such an effect once developed countries are excluded. Scruggs (2009 Scruggs ( ) uses the 1972 Scruggs ( -2000 average Freedom House democracy score (not discounted) to study whether democracies tended to improve their environmental performance at a higher rate than autocracies during 1990-2000. Eight indicators were used in aggregated form, two of which are related to climate change (CO 2 and methane (CH 4 ) emissions). Scruggs finds no effect of his democracy measure on environmental performance. It is noteworthy that many of the ambiguous effects of democracy reported in the literature relate either to climate change emissions or to climate change policies. It is therefore intentional that we focus on climate change in our analysis of the effect of democratic capital (the history of democratic experience) and its relative importance compared to the current level of democracy. It is also intentional that we focus on a comprehensive measure of climate change policies rather than on carbon emissions. Additional greenhouse gases are relevant and, importantly, it takes time for policies to translate into noticeable changes to emissions. We therefore contend that a policy measure rather than the level of emissions is the more informative dependent variable to study.
Empirical Approach and Data
The hypothesis to be tested is whether a higher democratic capital stock raises the stringency of climate change policies. Our measure of the stringency of climate change policies across countries is Steves et al.'s (2013) Climate Laws, Institutions and Measures Index (CLIMI), derived from the 2005-2010 annual national communications to the UNFCCC. CLIMI measures countries' adopted policies that address climate change through mitigation (not adaptation). The components of CLIMI are (relative weight and within-component sub-weights within parenthesis): international cooperation (0.1) (subgroups: Kyoto ratification (0.5), Joint Implementation or Clean Development Mechanism host (0.5)), domestic climate framework (0.4) (subgroups: cross-sectoral climate change legislation (0.33), carbon emissions target (0.33), dedicated climate change institution (0.33)), significant sectoral fiscal or regulatory measures or targets (0.4) (subgroups: energy supplies/renewables (0.3), industry (0.2), forestry (0.17), agriculture (0.13), transport (0.13), buildings (0.07)), and additional cross-sectoral fiscal or regulatory measures (0.1). CLIMI takes values between 0 and 1; higher values represent stricter policies. The UK has the highest CLIMI score at 0.801 while Tonga has the lowest at 0.011.
As a second dependent variable, we use a measure of global environmental cooperation from Esty et al. (2005) , the Global Environmental Cooperation Index. This index is a combination of information pertaining to a country's number of memberships in environmental intergovernmental organizations, contribution to international and bilateral funding of environmental projects and development aid, and participation in international environmental agreements.
Our main dependent variable CLIMI is derived from information collected over the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . All values for our explanatory variables are averages over this time period. The independent variables of main interest are democratic capital and the current level of democracy, both building on the polity2 variable from the Polity IV data set (Marshall and Jaggers, 2007) . We create a number of measures of Democratic Capital using different time frames and cut-offs for the definitions of democracy versus autocracy. Polity2 takes values between −10 (strict autocracy) and 10 (consolidated democracy). We use two 7 From, e.g., the literature on the EKC, per capita income is well known to be an important determinant of environmental policies and pollution levels.
8 Due to its focus on the EKC, it also has a completely different set of control variables.
alternative definitions of democracy. First, we define democracies as those having a positive polity2 score, following Persson and Tabellini (2009) . As an alternative, we define democracies as those having a polity2 score above 5 since countries below this threshold (but above −5) are usually categorized as "anocracies"; combining characteristics from both democratic and autocratic regimes (Plümper and Neumayer, 2010) . As seen below, which definition is chosen makes little difference. This is perhaps not surprising since most countries fall close to the polar ends of polity2. Current Democracy is simply the average polity2 value for years 2005-2010. We use three different time periods to calculate democratic capital, all ending in year 2010. The alternative time periods are 1800-2010, 1900-2010, and 1950-2010, respectively . Note that if a country attains independence after these start years, then the measure starts in the year of the country's independence. The period 1800-2010 is the longest period possible given that polity2 starts in 1800, while the start year of 1900 follows Gallagher and Thacker (2008) . We employ 1950 as an alternative start year since it could be that only more recent democratic capital build-up matters. Following Persson and Tabellini (2009) , democratic capital accumulates in years in which a country is a democracy (an increase of one) but not when an autocracy. Democratic capital depreciates at a rate (1 − δ) per year, i.e. only a share δ remains of the prior year's capital stock. Let z i,t be the stock of democratic capital of country i in year t; a i,t is an indicator variable which takes a value of unity in years when country i is a democracy; zero otherwise. Democratic capital then accumulates according to z i,t = a i,t + δz i,t − 1 , where z i;t 0 ¼ 0. We calculate and utilize the values for Democratic Capital for t 0 = 1800, 1900, and 1950, respectively, and assume (1 − δ) = 0.06, following Persson and Tabellini. The resulting values are rescaled to lie in the range 0 to (converging to) 1 (by multiplying all calculated values by (1 − δ)) following Persson and Tabellini. Most of the countries with strictly autocratic current regimes also have low to very low values of Democratic Capital. However, there is significant variation among current democracies in their democratic capital stock. Some Eastern European countries like Hungary and Poland, for example, have polity2 values of 10, but their democratic capital is only slightly higher than the sample average at around 0.70. Mongolia, Serbia and Sierra Leone are further examples of high values of current democracy with fairly modest values of democratic capital. At the other extreme are the established Western countries with a democratic tradition such as the UK, the US, Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries, but also Costa Rica and India.
We measure lobbying and voters' incentives with two different variables. Per capita carbon emissions (CO 2 per capita emissions) from World Bank (2012) reflects consumers' incentive to keep fossil fuel prices low, as well as the fossil fuel producers' lobbying incentive to keep climate change policies weak. This variable thus reflects the amount at stake for CO 2 emitters, and thus their lobbying incentives. However, higher levels of per capita CO 2 likely also imply lower marginal abatement costs (Fredriksson et al., 2007) . We are aware that CLIMI may already have affected CO 2 per capita emissions, but believe that the resulting reverse causality is sufficiently small not to create much endogeneity concern. We show below that our results are not affected by dropping this variable. KP Commitment measures the emission reduction commitment in percent emission reductions relative to 1990 (or an alternative base year) of Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol. Countries with such commitment, whether they honor it or not, can be expected to have better climate change policies, not least because it gives environmental lobby groups stronger traction to press the government into formulating better climate change policies (Aichele and Felbermayr, 2012) . In the estimations reported below, KP Commitment is set to zero for all non-Annex 1 countries as they have never signed up to any emission reduction targets. The results are however fully robust toward setting this variable to −8 for all non-Annex 1 countries.
−8 is the observed minimum among Annex 1 countries in the sample (Australia was allowed to increase its emissions by 8%, hence it scores −8).
9 To control for the effect that non-Annex 1 countries have on this variable, we include a dummy variable for non-Annex 1 countries. Per capita income in thousands of US$ in purchasing power parity, GDPpc, captures the increase in demand for environmental quality as income rises (World Bank, 2012 
where i denotes country, α is a constant, β i , i = 1,.,7 are variable coefficients, and ε i is the error term. In our main estimations, we use ordinary least squares (OLS). Since our sample is necessarily cross-sectional, we cannot control for unobserved country heterogeneity with the help of country fixed effects. One may therefore be concerned whether unobserved country heterogeneity correlated with a country's democratic history (Democratic Capital) is truly the driver of any positive effect of democracy on climate change policies. This represents a more pressing endogeneity concern than the potential moderate reverse causality of CLIMI on CO 2 per capita emissions. In robustness tests, we account for the possibility that Democratic Capital is correlated with the error term by instrumenting for it in two-stage least squares instrumental variable (IV) regressions. In these IV regressions, we instrument for Democratic Capital by the values of Democratic Capital in geographically contiguous countries. These are defined as countries that either share a land border or are separated by sea distance of less than 150 miles. These are sufficiently strong instruments to avoid the weak instrument problem, but they should be uncorrelated with unobserved country heterogeneity under the identification assumption that countries' unobserved heterogeneities are not themselves spatially correlated with each other across contiguous borders.
Empirical Results
The benchmark OLS results are presented in Table 2 . In addition to our basic control variables, Model 1 includes only Current Democracy and not Democratic Capital. Current Democracy has a positive, but statistically insignificant effect on CLIMI. Model 2 instead includes only Democratic Capital and not Current Democracy. Democratic Capital (1800-2010 data; polity2 N 0 as democracy cut-off) is statistically significant with the expected positive coefficient. Model 3 includes both Current Democracy and Democratic Capital. Despite the high correlation between the two variables (above 0.8), the estimations do not suffer from any apparent multi-collinearity problems. Their variance inflation factors are 5.73 and 5.28, respectively, and thus well below the values of 10 (or even 30), typically regarded as indicating multi-collinearity problems (Chatterjee and Hadi, 2006) . Democratic Capital continues to be statistically significant with a slightly larger coefficient size compared to Model 2, while Current Democracy continues to be statistically insignificant.
In Model 4, we drop CO 2 per capita emissions to check whether our results are affected potential reverse causality, even if it is likely to be very moderate in size. Results turn out to be fully robust. The effect of 9 Results for this alternative operationalization of KP Commitment are available upon request.
GDPpc decreases, but the effects of Current Democracy and Democratic
Capital stay practically the same as in Model 3. In Model 5, we restrict the sample to developing countries only by dropping all high-income OECD countries from the sample. Contrary to Gallagher and Thacker (2008) , Current Democracy does not matter in the developing country only sample. Having thus established that it is Democratic Capital rather than Current Democracy that matters for climate change policies, in the remaining models we omit Current Democracy. We also use five alternative definitions of Democratic Capital. Democratic Capital has a consistently positive and highly significant effect on CLIMI in all these models. This suggests that the more recent history of democracy (the last 60 years) is the most important determinant, and taking longer time periods into account (for which discounting also reduces the importance of democracy further) does not change the effect on CLIMI. Moreover, the estimated effects are non-negligible. Using Model 8 as an example, a 1 standard deviation change in Democratic Capital is estimated to result in a positive change equal to 23.2% of a standard deviation of CLIMI (CLIMI mean = 0.32; std. dev. = 0.23). Since much of the previous literature has ignored measures of the democratic capital stock, we believe our results shed new light on how democracy affects environmental policy.
Among the control variables, KP Commitments and GDPpc are consistently significant with the expected positive signs, and CO 2 per capita emissions is consistently negative and significant in all models. This suggests that the Kyoto Protocol may have a positive effect on climate policy stringency at the national level, while anti-climate change policy lobbying and voter-pressure are successful where CO 2 per capita emissions are large. Per capita income has the expected positive effect on climate change policies either because demand for such policies is a normal good or because richer countries are in a better position to formulate strong climate change policies. Economic Freedom has a positive effect that however is statistically insignificant, except in the sample of non-OECD countries.
Robustness Analysis
Tables 3 to 6 report results from robustness tests. The Democratic Capital measure used in Tables 3 and 5 starts in 1800 and classifies a democracy as having polity2 N 0, but neither the starting point nor the cut-off point matters for the results (results available upon request). In Table 3 , we add a number of control variables in order to avoid omitted variable bias. The additional controls include a measure of Climate (2012), measured as imports plus exports over GDP. Neumayer (2002b) shows that more open countries cooperate more on global environmental problems. Corruption has been shown to affect environmental policy negatively (see, e.g., Barbier et al., 2005) ; we use a measure of the absence of corruption from Kauffman et al. (2009) , Control of Corruption. Political stability affects the time horizon of politicians and thus their propensity to incur short-term cost in order to obtain long term benefits (Bohn and Deacon, 2000; Fredriksson and Svensson, 2003) . It fosters investment in "state capacity" (Besley and Persson, 2011) , which in turn increases the provision of public goods. Political Stability comes from Beck et al. (2001) . A Small Island State dummy takes into account the urgency of policymakers in countries threatened by sea-level rise to take action; it comes from World Bank (2012). Legal origin has been shown to influence policymaking, institutions and economic growth in fundamental ways (La Porta et al., 1999) ; we utilize dummies for French, Socialist, German, and Scandinavian Legal Origins (British Legal Origin is the excluded category). These robustness tests confirm the benchmark results. Democratic Capital is statistically significant in all models in These are highly consistent with our earlier estimates, as Democratic Capital is statistically significant in all models, and the same control variables remain significant with consistent signs. The Democratic Capital coefficient sizes are slightly larger but roughly equal to those reported in Tables 2 and 3 . In Table 5 , we undertake regional jackknife estimations to determine whether our results are driven by the inclusion of countries from a particular region in the sample, following the classification of regions by World Bank (2012). The previous results are robust to the exclusion of regions. Democratic Capital remains significant in all models except in Model 8, where it is marginally insignificant. This model excludes Latin America and the Caribbean, which has the highest levels of Democratic Capital outside the developed world and fairly stringent climate change policies compared to other developing countries. This is the cause of the marginally insignificant coefficient in this model. Note, however, that if we define democracies as scoring above polity2 values of 5, then Democratic Capital has a statistically significant effect even with the region of Latin America and the Caribbean excluded from the sample. Results for the control variables are similar to the ones reported in earlier tables.
In Table 6 we employ the Global Environmental Cooperation Index as our dependent variable. This variable is available for more countries, 10 We lose two observations since neither Fiji, nor New Zealand, is contiguous to any country. Table 7 we extend our analysis by dis-aggregating the concept of democracy as measured by the polity2 variable into its two most important components, constraints on the executive (a sub-component called xconst in Polity IV) and political competition (polcomp in Polity IV). The xconst measure reflects the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives imposed by one or more "accountability groups" (e.g., legislature, independent judiciary, council of nobles), thus capturing the extent of checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process. The polcomp measure reflects the existence of truly competitive, free, and fair elections. We define a country as having in place sufficient constraints on the executive if the xconst variable, which runs from 1 to 7, takes on values of 6 or 7, which means the country either has executive parity or subordination, or is in between this and substantial limits on executive authority. We similarly define a country as having in place sufficient political competition if the polcomp variable, which runs from 1 to 10, takes on values of 9 or 10, which means the country either has fully free, fair and competitive elections or is in the transition to this state with limited conflict among competing groups or coercion from the state. Similar to the aggregate democracy measure, we construct capital stock measures based on these definitions, but also include the current values of executive constraints and political competition. Table 7 shows that current values of neither executive constraints nor political competition matter for CLIMI. Instead, the stock of executive constraints, i.e., a larger cumulative historical experience with such constraints, has a positive and statistically significant impact on climate policies. By contrast, the stock of political competition has no statistically significant effect. This suggests that it is the cumulative historical experience of constraints on the executive that matters for climate change policies rather than cumulative historical experience with free and competitive elections.
Conclusion
This paper argues that democratic capital (long-term historical experience with democracy) is an important determinant of climate change policies. In fact, we find that the current level of democracy has no effect on environmental policy once democratic capital is introduced. Higher levels of democratic capital stock (in particular, the stock of historical experience of constraints on the executive) are associated with more stringent climate change policies. Thus, recent transitions to democracy are unlikely to have short-term positive effects on environmental policies addressing climate change. As democracy is consolidated over time, we expect such transitions to eventually have a positive environmental policy impact, however. The Arab Spring (and other democratization) can be considered an initial step in the right direction also for the environment. In the short run additional policy measures and international cooperation appear necessary to address climate change. 
